STATE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
WILLIAM P. CERVONE, STATE ATTORNEY

Legal Bulletin 2004-03 **July 2006**
Editor: Rose Mary Treadway

A MESSAGE FROM BILL CERVONE STATE ATTORNEY

Many of you follow what happens in Tallahassee each year while the Legislature is in session, and some of you go back and forth, as I do, lobbying or at least monitoring various bills. As we do each year, the October Legal Bulletin will include a summary of legislative changes for the year that impact some aspect of the criminal justice system. For a moment, I'd like to mention one procedural change that has passed.

If you have sat through a trial, you understand that the rules we operate under currently provide that the State gets to give the final closing argument only if the defense calls witnesses. If the defense either calls no witnesses or calls only the defendant as a witness, then the defense gets the last word. Whether or not this really matters is debatable but many people strongly believe that having the final chance to address the jury can be an important part of the trial. Beyond that, many more people, including me, believe that since it is the State that is bringing the case and has the burden of proof, then the State should have the right to the last word. That's the way things work in non-criminal trials, and that's the way it works in 46 of the other states, Florida excluded, in criminal cases.

After years of trying to change this without any luck, this year, Florida's prosecutors, with the help of other law enforcement groups, were able to have legislation passed that accomplished this.

Effective October 1st, and unless the Florida Supreme Court says otherwise, Florida procedure will give the State the right to present the final closing argument regardless of the way the evidence has been presented. Since the Court will consider this issue later in the summer, the battle is not yet over but we are significantly

further ahead than in the past.

When I talked to various legislators about this change during the recently concluded session, I urged them to look at this as a chance to not only give our Assistants a potentially powerful tool but also as an opportunity to make an affirmative statement that the legislature understands and supports what we are trying to do. When it so often seems that new laws and especially court rulings always favor the defendant, it is refreshing to have this favorable change actually pass.

Stay tuned for the rest of the story. We should know where we stand within the next few months.

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SAO PERSONNEL CHANGES

Gainesville Misdemeanor ASA **BRENT GORDON** is leaving effective July 21 to enter private practice in St. Petersburg.

New ASAs starting August 1st are **STEFFAN ALEXANDER** and **ANNEMARIE RIZZO**. Both are May graduates of the UF Law School and both interned in Gainesville during their last term. Both will be assigned to County Court in Gainesville.

Also new ASA hires include **ANDY MOREY**, who started in May and is also a UF Law grad and former intern; and **JESSE IRBY**, who graduated in May from Florida Coastal Law School. Both are assigned to Gainesville County Court pending Bar passage.

ASA **DAVID OBERLIESSEN** resigned in May to enter private practice in the Panama City area.

Former Baker County Sheriff's Office Investigator **MIKE COMBS** has joined the SAO as an Investigator assigned to Baker, Bradford and Union Counties.

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CONGRATULATIONS!

In May, awards honoring the following were handed out at the Baker County Law Enforcement Memorial: Explorer of the Year: **CALEB BEDELL**; Communications Officer of the Year: **REBECCA PARKER**; Detention Deputy of the Year: Deputy **BRAD HARVEY**; Joseph Burtner Award: Deputy **BILL STARLING** and Investigator **SCOTTY RHODEN;** Morris Fish Award: Deputy **BRAD DOUGHERTY.**

The Gainesville Police Department lost several officers to retirement recently including Detective **MIKE NEELY**, Detective **HELEN LEGALL** and her husband, Sergeant **TED LEGALL**, and Detective Sergeant **VAL DAWSON** and her husband Detective Sergeant **ALAN COLEMAN**.

In addition, GPD trainees Officers **MANIBUSAN** and **C. PEREZ** recently departed.

ASA **RICH CHANG** was awarded a certificate from the Police Benevolent Association, North Central Florida Chapter, Levy County for his support and contributions to Law Enforcement while working as a prosecutor in Levy County.

In April, GPD Officer **SCOTT**

FERREL was recognized at the 2006 MADD Awards Luncheon in Tallahassee as a "100+ arrest officer."

The Florida Council on Crime and Delinquency, Chapter V, bestowed its Criminal Justice Award to ASA **MARGARET STACK** for her leadership in chairing the Bar Association's Annual Christmas Holiday Project, which contributed over 500 Christmas bags and toys to needy children in 2005.

Also honored by the Council was **TONY JONES**, of the Gainesville Police Department, who was presented with the Juvenile Justice Award and Union County Deputy **KENNETH E. SMITH, JR.**, who received the Law Enforcement Award for saving the life of a fellow deputy who was involved in a fiery car crash in Union County.

Gainesville ASAs **SHAWN THOMPSON** and **ANGIE CHESSER** were married in June (to each other!).

The Gainesville SAO had a bumper crop of new babies born since January, including:

Tessa Elisabeth Becker, born to ASA **MICHAEL BECKER** and his wife, Pam, in January;

Rachel Hannah Turney, born to ASA **FRANCINE TURNEY** and her husband, Paul, in March;

Richard "Emory" Ezzell, born to ASA **BILL EZZELL** and his wife, Tara, in April;

Molly Elizabeth Silverman, born to ASA **JOSH SILVERMAN** and his wife, Erin, in March;

Mason Steven Steinberg, born to ASA **STACEY STEINBERG** and her husband, Ben, in March.

Keep watching **NBC's America's Got Talent** to see the SAO's own **JOE LOFFREDO** and his band *Ten 13 Concept* try to get to the finals this month to win $ 1 million! The show is broadcast on Wednesday nights. GO JOE!

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CASE LAW UPDATE

US SUPREME COURT CASES

CRAWFORD REVISITED

In June, the United States Supreme Court, in two cases, expanded on it's **Crawford v Washington** opinion which held that the Confrontation Clause bars "admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."

In **Davis v Washington**, a 911 operator ascertained from McCottry that she had been assaulted by her former boyfriend, Davis, who had just fled the scene. McCottry did not testify at Davis' trial, but the court admitted the 911 recording despite Davis's objection that it was a violation of his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.

And in **Hammon v Indiana,** police responded to a reported domestic disturbance at the home of Amy and Hershel Hammon. Amy told them that nothing was wrong, but gave

them permission to enter. Once inside, one officer kept Hammon in the kitchen while another officer interviewed Amy elsewhere and had her complete and sign a battery affidavit. Amy did not appear at Hershel Hammon's trial but her affidavit and testimony from the officer were admitted over Hershel's objection that he had no opportunity to cross-examine her.

Both Davis and Hammon were convicted at the trial level and appealed.

The Supreme Court *affirmed* Davis's conviction and *reversed* Hammon's conviction.

The difference between the two is that the **Davis** case involved a 911 call where the primary purpose of the police interrogation was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. McCottry was speaking of events as they were actually happening and the statements elicited were necessary to enable police to resolve the present emergency rather than simply to learn what had happened in the past.

The **Hammon** case, according to the Court, involved no such ongoing emergency and the primary purpose was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO HOME UPON EMERGENCY

The US Supreme Court has also ruled in **Brigham City v Stuart** that police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.

Responding to a 3 am call about a loud party, police arrived at the house in question, heard shouting inside, proceeded down the driveway, and saw two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. Entering the yard, they saw through a screen door and windows an altercation in the kitchen between four adults and a juvenile, who punched one of the adults, causing him to spit blood in a sink.

An officer opened the screen door and announced the officers' presence. Unnoticed amid the tumult, the officer entered the kitchen and again cried out, whereupon the altercation gradually subsided. The officers arrested the defendants and charged them with contributing to the delinquency and related charges.

The trial court suppressed the evidence on the ground that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment; the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court as did the Utah Supreme Court, who held that the injury caused by the juvenile's punch was insufficient to trigger the "emergency aid doctrine" because it did not give rise to an objectively reasonable belief that an unconscious, semiconscious, or missing person feared injured or dead was in the home. Furthermore, the court suggested the doctrine was inapplicable because the officers had not sought to assist the injured

adult but had acted exclusively in a law enforcement capacity. The court also held that the entry did not fall within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

The U.S. Supreme Court *disagreed*, holding that in assessing the reasonableness of an entry, the officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant. It did not matter whether they entered the kitchen to arrest the defendants and gather evidence or to assist the injured and prevent further violence. "Given the tumult at the house when they arrived, it was obvious that knocking on the front door would have been futile. Moreover, in light of the fracas they observed in the kitchen, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence was just beginning. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment required them to wait until another blow rendered someone unconscious, semiconscious, or worse before entering."

The Court further held that the manner of the entry was also reasonable, since nobody heard the first announcement of their presence, and it was only after the announcing officer stepped into the kitchen and announced himself again that the tumult subsided. "That announcement was at least equivalent to a knock on the screen door and, under the circumstances, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment's knock and announce rule. Furthermore, once the announcement was made, the officers were free to enter; it would serve no purpose to make them stand dumbly at the door awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their presence."

NO EXCLUSION FOR "KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE" VIOLATIONS

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in **Hudson v Michigan** that violation of the Fourth Amendment's "Knock and Announce" rule does not require suppression of evidence found in a search.

Detroit police executing a search warrant for narcotics and weapons entered Hudson's home in violation of the "Knock and Announce rule" because they only waited "three to five seconds" before entering. Hudson moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the premature entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court, reviewing the law relating to "Knock and Announce" reiterated that law enforcement, before entering a home, must announce their presence and provide residents an opportunity to open the door unless there is reason to believe that circumstances present a threat of physical violence, or if evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given, or if knocking and announcing would be "futile". "We require only that police 'have a reasonable suspicion…under the particular circumstances' that one of these grounds for failing to knock and announce exists…". In this case, none of those circumstances existed.

The Court found that although there was a clear violation here based on the short wait period before entering, the remedy is not suppression of the evidence. Hudson had argued that the only way to deter police misconduct like this is suppression of the evidence but the Court disagreed, saying that many forms of police misconduct are deterred by civil-rights suits, and by the consequences of increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police discipline. "The social costs to be weighed against deterrence are considerable here. In addition to the grave adverse consequence that excluding relevant incriminating evidence always entails, the risk of releasing dangerous criminals, imposing such a massive remedy would generate a constant flood of alleged failure to observe the rule, and claims that any asserted justification for a no-knock entry had inadequate support."

Another consequence would be police officers' refraining from timely entry after knocking and announcing, producing preventable violence against the officers in some cases and the destruction of evidence in others.

"What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected, however, is one's interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. Since the interest that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable."

Note: A month before the **Hudson** decision was released, the Florida Supreme Court, in **Spradley v State** *reversed* his conviction based on violation of Florida's Knock and Announce Statute, F.S.933.09. Perhaps the Florida Supreme Court will take another look at **Spradley** in light of **Hudson**.

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FLORIDA CASES

ROBBERY BY SUDDEN SNATCHING-NOT!

In April, the First DCA reviewed the line between Theft and Robbery by Sudden Snatching in **Nichols v State.**

Nichols grabbed a purse from a shopping cart being pushed by Heidi Day and ran. Nothing indicates that the purse was either being held by the victim or was otherwise on her person. The victim became immediately aware of Nichol's actions as he took the purse from the shopping cart. No force against her, nor touching of her, occurred.

In 1999, the Legislature created the statutory offense of Robbery by Sudden Snatching, Florida Statute 812.131(1). The definition of that offense will ensnare any person guilty of the "taking of money or other property from the victim's person, with intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the victim or the owner of the money or other property, when, in the course of taking, the victim

was or became aware of the taking."

By enacting the statute, the Legislature sought to make clear that, henceforth, the sudden snatching of property by no more force than is necessary to remove the property from a person who does not resist would amount to a species of robbery in Florida.

The Nichols court held that the above scenario did not meet the elements of Sudden Snatching such as to sustain conviction for anything more than theft saying that the "clear import of the statute's words is to require that the property be abruptly and unexpectedly plucked from the embrace of the person."

Here, the purse, while in the victim's custody, was not on her *person*, as required by the plain words of the statute.

MORE ROBBERY BY SUDDEN SNATCHING-NOT!

In May, the Third DCA in **Walker v State** held that Walker was erroneously convicted of Robbery by Sudden Snatching where the State failed to prove that the victim knew her wallet was being taken from her purse *during* the course of the taking.

The victim testified that she was on a public bus on her way to take care of business. She saw Walker and a female enter the bus. The victim had a raincoat and a black purse with long straps with her. When the victim rang the bus to stop, she opened her purse to get her umbrella. She saw her wallet and make-up case inside. She got the umbrella, closed her purse, and placed it under her arm. The bus then stopped and she got up to walk to the front of the bus. She put her raincoat on and held her purse outside of her raincoat.

When the victim reached the front of the bus to exit, the female jumped in front of her and did not allow her to get off. The female bent down, looked for something inside of her (the female's) bag, and told her to wait a minute. The victim felt a tug on her purse, like a push. She turned around, looked at Walker and said, "Sir, please don't push. We are all getting off the bus if the lady let's me get off." The victim thought something weird was happening when she felt her bag being tugged. She pulled the bag in front of her to keep it safe. She heard Walker say, "Got it." She, along with Walker and the female, exited the bus. When the victim arrived home, she realized the purse was open and her wallet and make-up case were gone.

The victim also testified that she was not clutching her purse when Walker bumped into her. She only clutched her purse when she felt the tugging and the bump because she felt that something was going on that was not right. She never felt her bag being opened and she never felt or saw any items being removed from her purse while on the bus.

The Third DCA noted that the

Robbery by Sudden Snatching statute specifically requires that "…*when, in the course of the taking, the victim was or became aware of the taking*…" "The language of the statute provides that the victim must become aware of the sudden snatching at the time during which the snatching is taking place. This is an essential element of the crime…"

Thus, since the victim was unaware that anything had been taken *at the time during which the robbery occurred,* the crime of Robbery by Sudden Snatching cannot be sustained.

DEPRIVING OFFICER OF MEANS OF PROTECTION OR COMMUNICATION

In a case of first impression, the Fourth DCA has held in **Rodriguez v State** that the offense of Depriving an Officer of Means of Protection or Communication pursuant to Florida Statutes 843.025 can be committed by depriving the officer of his handcuffs.

Broward Sheriff's Deputy Keegan responded to a domestic disturbance and found Rodriguez yelling and screaming. The deputy felt it was necessary to separate Rodriguez from the other parties and handcuff him. During the attempt to handcuff the defendant, Rodriguez grabbed the cuffs from the deputy. In order to attempt to gain control over the defendant, it was necessary for him to use pepper spray and to strike Rodriguez with his baton, at which point the deputy was able to grab the cuffs out of Rodriguez's hand, cuff him and take him into custody.

Rodriguez argued that handcuffs are not a means of defending oneself as required by the statute and his conviction cannot stand because his conduct does not constitute the charged offense.

The DCA, in *affirming* the conviction, stated that the deputy's first choice to protect and defend himself was to resort to the use of handcuffs. "Clearly the handcuffs were an instrument used by Deputy Keegan to protect and defend himself."

CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION AND MULTIPLE OCCUPANTS

A Hendry County deputy stopped a car that Hargrove was driving. A passenger was in the front seat, and two passengers were in the rear seat. Hargrove exited the car and spoke with the deputy while the passengers remained in the car. Two other deputies arrived, and one began checking on the passengers and looking into the car. This deputy saw a "smoking crack pipe" on the front floorboard on the driver's side of the car. None of the deputies saw Hargrove in possession of the pipe, and they did not see whether the passengers made any hand movements prior to the discovery of the pipe. The pipe contained cocaine residue.

At trial, Hargrove's defense was that he was not in possession of the pipe and that one of the passengers could have placed it on the

floorboard after he exited the car. He argued that other than establishing the location of the pipe and the fact that he had been driving the car, the State did not present any evidence connecting him to the pipe and residue or demonstrating his knowledge of their presence or illicit nature.

Because Hargrove was not in actual possession of the pipe, the State had to establish his constructive possession of the pipe and residue. The State's burden is to prove that the defendant knew of the presence of the illegal items, was able to exercise dominion and control over them and knew of their illicit nature. Knowledge of and ability to control the contraband cannot be inferred solely from the defendant's proximity to the contraband in a jointly-occupied vehicle; rather, the State must present independent proof of the defendant's knowledge and ability to control the contraband.
Here, the State's sole proof of Hargrove's constructive possession was the pipe's proximity to the seat that he had been occupying in the car. The Second DCA in **Hargrove v State** held that even if it accepted the State's view that Hargrove's knowledge of the contraband should be inferred because the pipe was emanating smoke when the deputy found it, there was no evidence that Hargrove was able to exercise dominion and control over the pipe.

The Second DCA *reversed* Hargrove's conviction. The court, however, noted in a footnote that since F.S. 893.101, enacted in 2002 after this incident occurred, a defendant's knowledge of the illicit nature of the contraband is no longer required to establish a defendant's constructive possession of contraband, but a defendant may assert his lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of contraband as an affirmative defense.

JAIL CELLS AND WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

Defendant Thomas, who was in the county jail awaiting trial on murder charges, sought to suppress the search of his jail cell and seizure of red high-topped tennis shoes discovered under his bunk.

A witness had described the clothing of the gunman who had murdered a victim as well as identifying the gunman as Thomas. After Thomas was booked into the Miami-Dade County Jail, the State attempted to ascertain whether Thomas was in possession of the shoes described. A property room supervisor confirmed that the defendant had not received any footwear from any source after he was booked into the jail, and thereafter, a correctional officer checked the defendant's cell, and saw a red pair of sneakers sitting under the defendant's bunk. Based upon this information, the State obtained a search warrant, seized the sneakers, and introduced them at trial after they were positively identified by the witness.

The defendant argued that the search of his cell by a correctional officer upon the

request by the State, prior to obtaining a warrant, violated his right to privacy and his Fourth Amendment rights against a warrantless search absent exigent circumstance.

The Third DCA in **Gillis v State**, *disagreed*, holding that a public jail cell does not share the same privacy as an individual's home, car, office or motel room. "This is especially true regarding an arrestee's clothing and the personal effects found on his/her person at the time of his/her arrest." The court held that when it became apparent that the articles of clothing were evidence of the crime for which the defendant was being held, the police were entitled to take, examine, and preserve them for use as evidence. Further, the court agreed that once the accused is lawfully arrested and in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of his arrest may be lawfully searched and seized without a warrant, even when a substantial period of time has elapsed between the arrest and processing and the seizure of the property, regardless of whether the property is found in the arrestee's cell or held under the arrestee's name in the property room. "Once the defendant is in custody, the items that were on his person at the time of his arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant…"

COUNTERFEIT LICENCE TAG *NOT* THE SAME AS COUNTERFEIT TEMPORARY TAG

The State charged Herrera-Lara with possessing a counterfeit registration license plate in violation of F.S. 320.26(1)(a) when he displayed a photocopy of a temporary tag. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, admitting that he was in possession of a counterfeit temporary tag but asserting that possession of a counterfeit temporary tag does not violate section 320.26(1)(a). He argued that a temporary tag is different from a registration license plate and that because the term "temporary tag" is not identified in the list of counterfeit items contained in section 320.26, the statute does not apply to his conduct.

The Second DCA in **Herrera-Lara v State** agreed and *reversed* the conviction, holding that temporary tags are addressed in section 320.131, which describes unlawful conduct relating to temporary tags, including the knowing and willful abuse or misuse of temporary tags. Section 320.26(1(a) addresses counterfeit *registration license plates*, validation stickers, or mobile home stickers, and describes registration license plates as metal treated with retro reflective material.

The court concluded by stating that "…in light of the statutory scheme contained in chapter 320, we conclude that the legislature assigned different meanings to the terms 'registration license plates' on the one hand and 'temporary tags' or 'temporary license plates' on the other hand. Accordingly, section 320.26 does not apply to Herrera-Lara's possession of a

counterfeit temporary tag."

STOP AND DETAIN TO "TALK"

The need to talk to an individual about an incident does not give officers sufficient reason to stop and detain the person without his consent, the Second DCA ruled in **Keeling v State**, in June.

After gathering information about an incident at a convenience store and obtaining a description of a vehicle seen leaving the area, St. Petersburg Police Officer Troy Achey stopped a truck matching the description. Danny Keeling was driving the truck when the officer pulled him over. Achey, who had not been told to stop the vehicle or detain the driver for questioning, noticed that Keeling was impaired and subsequently arrested him for driving under the influence. Keeling contends on appeal that Officer Achey had no reasonable suspicion to pull him over, and therefore the stop was illegal. The DCA agreed and *reversed* the denial of Keeling's motion to suppress evidence against him.

"It is clear that the officer lacked a founded suspicion to stop and detain Keeling or his vehicle. The commotion at the convenience store did not support the stop, and indeed the officers at the scene did not request a BOLO for Keeling or his vehicle. Officer Achey's independent observations did not, and could not, give rise to anything more than a mere suspicion of unlawful activity. If the officers desired to question Keeling concerning the alleged brawling incident, they should have waited for him to park and voluntarily exit his vehicle. At that point, a consensual citizen encounter would have occurred, and the odor of alcohol emanating from Keeling might then have served as probable cause to ultimately effectuate a valid DUI arrest," the DCA said.

ACCIDENT REPORT PRIVILEGE

Casselberry Police Sergeant Buster responded to the site of a reported accident and learned from both Defendant Cino and the driver of the other involved vehicle that Cino had been driving one of the two wrecked vehicles. He also smelled alcohol on Cino's breath and slurred speech.

Buster reported his observations to Officer Munn, who then initiated a DUI investigation. Before questioning Cino, Officer Munn informed Cino that the traffic investigation was concluded; that he was now beginning a criminal DUI investigation; and, that he would need to first review Cino's rights with him. After Miranda rights were read to Cino, Cino waived those rights and answered the Officer's question, admitting to driving the vehicle and consuming four or five beers.

Cino moved to suppress these post-Miranda statements on the theory that the accident report privilege in Section 316.066(4) prohibited Sergeant Buster from legally sharing *any* information derived during his traffic investigation with Officer Munn. The trial court

accepted this argument, suppressing all of the evidence, including the officers' observations, and the other driver's statements. This County court case was appealed to the Circuit court who agreed with the lower court.

The State appealed to the Fifth DCA who quashed the lower court and returned the case for trial, ruling in **State v Cino** that the accident report privilege did not preclude the State from using the first officer's observations of the defendant's physical appearance, general demeanor, slurred speech, or breath scent, as well as the statements of persons, other than the defendant, during the initial traffic investigation.

"Contrary to the circuit court's decision, section 316.066(4) only prohibits the State from using as evidence at trial either the crash report or statements made to law enforcement during a traffic investigation by persons involved in the crash… the privilege against self-incrimination only protects an accused from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature." Further, the Court found no error in law enforcement testifying as to statements made to him during his traffic investigation by anyone other than the defendant. The purpose of section 316.066(4) accident report privilege is to ensure that the State does not violate an individual's constitutional privilege against self incrimination when he or she is compelled to truthfully report to law enforcement the facts surrounding an automobile accident.

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FOR COPIES OF CASES…

For a copy of the complete text of any of the cases mentioned in this or an earlier issue of the Legal Bulletin, please call ASA Rose Mary Treadway at the SAO at 352-374-3672.

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REMINDER: LEGAL BULLETIN NOW ON-LINE

The Legal Bulletin is now available on-line, including old issues beginning with calendar year 2000. To access the Legal Bulletin go to the SAO website at sawww.co.alachua.fl.us and click on the "legal bulletin" box.

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PARKING ALERT

Law Enforcement officers are reminded to seek parking spaces in those areas designated for "Law Enforcement Only" at the Gainesville SAO in order to free up other spaces for the public.

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REMINDER

Law Enforcement Officers are reminded to check in with the receptionist at the Gainesville SAO before entering the locked glass doors to see an attorney. The receptionist will then telephone the attorney so that the officers can be met and escorted to their destinations.

Also, officers are reminded to either bring their subpoenas or know the name of the attorney they are there to see.